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—  Note  — 
Re-Punishing the Innocent:  
False Confession as an Unjust 
Obstacle to Compensation for 
the Wrongfully Convicted 
“Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the 
innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream.” 
—Learned Hand, 1923* 
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Introduction 
In 2006, Douglas Warney was released from prison after serving 
nine years and two months for a murder he did not commit.1 The 
resident of Rochester, New York, was convicted of stabbing a 
neighborhood acquaintance to death in 1997 and sentenced to twenty-
five years to life, but he was exonerated after a DNA test of crime 
scene evidence implicated another man, who subsequently confessed.2 
By the time of his release, Warney had spent 3,380 days in prison for 
the crime.3 New York State’s Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment 
Act,4 in force since 1984, is designed to compensate exonerees for the 
time they spent wrongfully incarcerated. But when Warney filed a 
claim, he was denied.5  
 
* United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). 
1. Warney v. State, 947 N.E.2d 639, 640 (N.Y. 2011). 
2. Id. at 641–42. 
3. Id. at 642. Warney was convicted on February 12, 1997, and his 
conviction was vacated and sentence set aside on May 16, 2006. 
4. N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8-b (McKinney 2013). 
5. Warney, 947 N.E.2d at 642. 
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The statute makes an exoneree eligible for compensation only if he 
“did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction.”6 
Warney, who was mentally disabled with an IQ of sixty-eight and 
suffering from AIDS-related dementia, had signed a written confession 
that served as the centerpiece of the prosecution’s case.7 He later 
recanted and claimed he had been coerced by interrogators—a claim 
bolstered by the DNA results—and his attorneys discovered factual 
anomalies suggesting police misconduct during his interrogation.8 But a 
New York judge decided that his case met the statutory standard: Warney 
had caused or brought about his own conviction by confessing, and so in 
recompense for those 3,380 days, New York State owed him nothing.9 
The oft-quoted principle that it is better to let guilty men go free 
than to punish an innocent man is axiomatic in Anglo-American 
criminal law and has deep roots.10 Besides reflecting the fundamental 
value our legal system places on personal liberty and the high burden 
required to deprive someone of that liberty, the principle also embodies 
a basic admission—that the single most egregious error a justice system 
can commit is to punish the innocent. 
The natural corollary to this principle is that society has a special 
responsibility to make efforts toward righting the wrong when it occurs. 
A majority of U.S. states, along with the District of Columbia and the 
federal government, have recognized that responsibility by passing 
statutes that provide compensation for exonerees after their release. 
Like New York’s, however, many of these statutes include conditions 
that deny compensation to certain categories of exonerees. Such 
conditions are based largely on the rationale that some exonerees, 
despite the reversal of their convictions, in one way or another 
contributed to their own plight. The statute drafters deemed such 
contributions worthy of punishment, deciding that society does not owe 
the same responsibility to these exonerees that it owes to others. 
Reasonable minds may differ on the propriety of ever denying 
compensation to someone who was incarcerated for a crime he did not 
commit. But all should agree that denials of compensation, if they are 
to occur, should be limited to exonerees whose contributory conduct 
was truly blameworthy—that is, outside the range of conduct society 
reasonably expects of defendants in the criminal justice system. 
 
6. N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8–b(5)(d). 
7. Warney, 947 N.E.2d at 641–42. 
8. Innocence Project, Case Summary: Douglas Warney. 
9. This decision was later overturned on appeal. See infra Part V. 
10. See, e.g., 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *352 (“[T]he law 
holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one 
innocent suffer.”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (“[A] fundamental value determination of our society that it is 
far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”). 
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This Note argues that one type of preconviction conduct, the false 
confession, which has contributed to scores of demonstrably wrongful 
convictions in America, should never be allowed to serve as an 
automatic basis for the denial of exoneree compensation. In recent 
years, criminological and psychological research have provided a greater 
understanding than ever of the causes of false confessions. They have 
revealed that a popular common-sense assumption—that no one would 
confess to a crime he did not commit unless he had some ulterior 
motive, was recklessly dishonest, or was coerced via torture—simply 
does not reflect reality. Powerfully refined modern interrogation tactics 
can manipulate innocent people into confessing, and sometimes even 
into believing their own confessions, through no genuine fault of their 
own. There is potential for great injustice when state compensation 
systems fail to adapt to this modern understanding, imposing 
restrictions broad enough to deny compensation to exonerees whose 
“contribution” was not blameworthy by any reasonable standard. 
I. Compensation for the Wrongfully Convicted 
Throughout most of the American justice system’s history, there 
was “little reason to take much stock in [postconviction] claims of 
innocence.”11 Once a defendant had been found guilty, the odds of 
producing new evidence sufficient to upset a jury verdict were 
astronomically low. Then, as now, “many claims of innocence [were] 
made, but few [were] sustained.”12 But in the late 1980s, the first 
applications of forensic DNA identification introduced a “revolution in 
the criminal justice system.”13 Suddenly, it was possible in certain cases 
to produce conclusive scientific evidence of a wrongful conviction years 
or even decades after the crime. With the rise of The Innocence Project 
and other prisoner advocacy groups, the number of annual DNA 
exonerations nationwide increased steadily throughout the 1990s and 
now hovers at around twenty per year.14 In short, DNA “has taught us 
. . . that there are more innocent people in jail than we ever thought.”15 
 
11. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Roberts Court’s Failed Innocence Project, 85 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 43, 45 (2010). 
12. Id. 
13. Andrei Semikhodskii, Dealing with DNA Evidence 1 (2007). 
14. Innocence Project Case Profiles, Innocence Project, http://www. 
innocenceproject.org/know/Search-Profiles.php (last visited Apr. 14, 
2013). Figures for the last seven years are as follows: eighteen DNA 
exonerations in 2006; nineteen in 2007; fifteen in 2008; twenty-three in 
2009; eighteen in 2010; fifteen in 2011; and seventeen in 2012.  
15. Interview by Frontline, PBS, with Barry Scheck, Co-Founder, The 
Innocence Project, available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/case/interviews/scheck.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). 
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As the number of overturned convictions grew, more and more 
states confronted the need to compensate exonerees for the justice 
system’s failure and for the losses they suffered due to their 
incarceration. Whereas compensation statutes were once a rarity, 
found only in a few states where public attention to a high-profile 
exoneration had stirred the legislature to action,16 the 2000s saw a 
boom in state legislative progress. Thirteen states passed new 
statutes, nearly doubling the number of states offering some form of 
statutory compensation to twenty-seven (plus the District of Columbia 
and the federal government).17 Others updated their statutes to raise 
the amount of exoneree awards.18 In 2004, Massachusetts became the 
first state to supplement its monetary compensation with “services 
. . . reasonable and necessary to address any deficiencies in the 
individual’s physical and emotional condition.”19 More states quickly 
followed suit, and ten now offer some form of addition support, 
including job training and placement, health insurance, counseling, 
housing assistance, and legal services.20 Such efforts reflect a growing 
recognition of the many hardships exonerees face upon release.21 
Statutes are not the only avenue for compensation available to the 
wrongfully convicted after exoneration. Exonerees may also turn to civil 
lawsuits, though this alternative is costly and time consuming, and 
typically requires a showing that the conviction was due to intentional 
misconduct by an identifiable party.22 Private bills, by which a state 
legislature acts to compensate one specific individual, have also been used 
in a handful of cases, though they are “dangerously prone to becoming 
‘popularity contests’ based as much on the celebrity of the exoneree 
 
16. In a 1941 article, Yale University Professor Edwin Borchard lamented 
that only three states (Wisconsin, North Dakota, and California) had as 
of then enacted exoneree compensation statutes. He also noted that the 
United States lagged far behind Europe and Latin America in adopting 
uniform statutory remedies for the wrongfully convicted. Edwin Borchard, 
State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 21 B.U. L. Rev. 201, 
202 (1941). 
17. Innocence Project, Making Up for Lost Time: What the 
Wrongfully Convicted Endure and How to Provide Fair 
Compensation 4 (2009) [hereinafter Lost Time]. 
18. Id. 
19. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, § 5(A) (2012) (enacted Dec. 30, 2004); 
Mary C. Delaney et al., Exonorees’ Hardships After Freedom, Wis. 
Law., Feb. 2010, at 18, 53. 
20. Lost Time, supra note 17, at 16. 
21. See generally Jennifer L. Chunias & Yael D. Aufgang, Beyond Monetary 
Compensation: The Need for Comprehensive Services for the Wrongfully 
Convicted, 28 B.C. Third World L.J. 105 (2008); Frontline: Burden 
of Innocence (PBS television broadcast May 1, 2003). 
22. Lost Time, supra note 17, at 12–13. 
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and the legislator introducing the bill as on the merits of the case.”23  
For those reasons, scholars and exoneree advocates generally agree 
that statutory compensation is the “only reliable and fair response to 
the inevitable mistakes that occur as a byproduct of the operation of 
a criminal justice system as large as ours.”24 The powerful social-
justice rationale for a uniform compensation regime funded with 
public money was eloquently stated by Yale University Professor 
Edwin Borchard in 1941: “Where the common interest is joined for a 
common end—maintaining the public peace by the prosecution of 
crime—each individual member being subject to the same danger 
(erroneous conviction), the loss when it occurs should be borne by the 
community as a whole and not by the injured individual alone.”25 
II. Statutory Restrictions on Compensation 
Two justifications are typically advanced to support restrictive 
conditions in exoneree compensation statutes: cost and a desire to 
avoid compensating the undeserving.26 The cost concern is facially 
unconvincing, as the small number of exonerations, even after the rise 
of DNA identification, practically guarantees that compensating 
exonerees will never amount to more than a tiny fraction of a state’s 
criminal justice budget. Even the four states with the most 
exonerations—Illinois, New York, Texas, and California—averaged 
between just two and three per state per year from 1989 to 2003, “a 
number that cannot reasonably be claimed will break the bank.”27 In 
addition, the rate of DNA-based exonerations will inevitably decline 
as the technology is more frequently employed during criminal 
investigations and trials, so that a defendant whose DNA proves his 
innocence is increasingly unlikely to be convicted in the first place.28  
23. Id. at 13. The inadequacy of the private bill system has long been 
recognized. See Borchard, supra note 16, at 202 (“[T]hese special 
statutes are enacted only spasmodically, and not all persons have the 
necessary influence to bring about legislation in their own behalf.”). 
24. Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust 
Conviction, 6 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 73, 74 (1999). 
25. Borchard, supra note 16, at 208. 
26. Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to 
Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later 
Exonerated, 52 Drake L. Rev. 703, 713 (2004). 
27. Deborah Mostaghel, Wrongfully Incarcerated, Randomly Compensated—
How to Fund Wrongful-Conviction Compensation Statutes, 44 Ind. L. 
Rev. 503, 529 (2011). The figures Mostaghel cites come from a 
landmark study of exonerations nationwide, Samuel R. Gross et al., 
Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. Crim. L. 
& Criminology 523, 541 (2005). 
28. See Bernhard, supra note 26, at 715 (“Overall . . . the rate of DNA 
exonerations will inevitably slow.”). 
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The worry over compensating the undeserving, however, is more 
complex, and it is certainly not new. A hundred years ago, writing a 
report on European compensation statutes for the U.S. Congress while 
serving as its Law Librarian, Borchard approvingly referenced “the 
equitable maxim that no one shall profit by his own wrong or come 
into court with unclean hands.”29 He noted that the European 
statutes generally incorporated some form of bar to limit 
compensation “to those only who are clearly shown to deserve it,”30 
and included as one example of the undeserving a defendant who “by 
willful misconduct or negligence, contributed to bring about his arrest 
or conviction.”31 
If the animating principle behind exoneree compensation statutes 
is that each member of society is “subject to the same danger,” as 
Borchard suggested, the desire to deny compensation to defendants 
who contribute to their conviction is understandable. Certain conduct 
may put an individual in extraordinary danger of erroneous 
conviction, beyond that which everyone must accept as a byproduct 
of the criminal justice system. Such an individual could reasonably be 
viewed as less deserving of remedial measures than someone who did 
everything we would expect of an innocent defendant but still was 
convicted for reasons entirely beyond his control. 
But a critical challenge is identifying the kinds of conduct that 
make an individual truly less deserving—which “contributions” to a 
conviction legitimately deserve to be punished with noncompensation. 
Among the state statutes, fourteen out of twenty-seven include some 
form of restriction that denies compensation based on the defendant’s 
preconviction conduct.32 The two most common types of conduct that 
may disqualify a claimant are confessions and guilty pleas.33 Some 
statutes are quite specific in their prohibitions—Nebraska’s, for 
instance, denies compensation to defendants who “commit or suborn 
perjury, fabricate evidence, or otherwise make a false statement.”34 
Others are less explicit, such as New Jersey’s statute, which allows for 
 
29. Edwin M. Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal 
Justice 32 (1912). This report, which includes an editorial preface by 
John H. Wigmore, is not to be confused with Borchard’s 1941 law 
review article of the same title, supra note 16. 
30. Id. at 14. 
31. Id. at 32. 
32. Lost Time, supra note 17, at 27–31. 
33. Bernhard, supra note 26, at 717. Bernhard based this generalization on 
a comparison of state statutes compiled in 2000, before roughly half of 
the present compensation statutes had been enacted, but a review of all 
the statutes in force today indicates her conclusion is still correct. 
34. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4603(4) (2012). 
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compensation only if an exoneree “did not by his own conduct cause 
or bring about his conviction.”35 
Among the statutes with restrictions, at least eight contain 
language that may deny compensation to an exoneree who falsely 
confessed. According to The Innocence Project’s state-by-state analysis, 
the statutes of California, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, New 
York, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin each have a provision 
with such potential.36 The practical result of these provisions is the 
possibility of punishing (or, more accurately, re-punishing) an 
exoneree whose false confession was used against him during an 
investigation or trial that led to a wrongful conviction. 
By punishing false confessions through noncompensation, the 
statutes treat the confessor’s act as blameworthy. In the past, that 
treatment may have seemed entirely reasonable as a reflection of 
common-sense fiscal restraint and just deserts. But modern scholarship 
suggests such an interpretation is badly outdated: a false confession, 
without more, is best interpreted not as a lie worthy of punishment, 
but as the consequence of an imperfect investigative process that can 
overwhelm and ultimately victimize an innocent confessor. 
III. An Evolving Understanding of False Confessions 
As discussed above, conventional wisdom once favored viewing 
postconviction claims of innocence with practically insurmountable 
skepticism, until DNA science exposed the unsettlingly prevalent 
potential for wrongful conviction. In a similar manner, our 
understanding of confessions—their reliability and vulnerabilities—has 
undergone a profound transformation due to scholarly and scientific 
inquiry. As a result, “it no longer seems rational to consider all false 
confessions as misconduct, because multiple exonerations prove that 
innocent people falsely implicate themselves, despite gaining nothing 
for themselves in the process.”37 
False confessions are inherently difficult to understand, and many 
people therefore believe they must be exceedingly rare. Psychology 
Professor Elizabeth F. Loftus has observed that “[p]eople intuitively 
feel that they would never confess to something they did not do.”38 
Eddie Lowery has made a similar observation, but based on different 
expertise. Lowery confessed to rape and spent ten years in a Kansas 
state prison before DNA proved his innocence, and he has described 
the typical reaction from those who learn of his ordeal: “You run in to 
 
35. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:4C–3(c) (West 2009). 
36. Lost Time, supra note 17, at 27–31. 
37. Bernhard, supra note 26, at 718 (footnote omitted). 
38. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Editorial: The Devil in Confessions, 5 Psychol. 
Sci. in the Pub. Int. i (2004). 
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so many people who say, ‘I would never confess to a crime [that I 
didn’t commit].’”39 Professor Saul Kassin, who lectures nationwide on 
the psychology of false confessions, has also observed the prevalence of 
public skepticism. The “most common reaction” he hears from 
audiences is the same familiar refrain: “Well, I would never do that. I 
would never confess to something I didn’t do.”40 
Indeed, it is illogical that any rational person would do so, given 
the grave consequences of a criminal conviction. It is tempting to 
dismiss false confessors as reckless or mischievous liars, and a certain 
number undoubtedly are—in possibly the most famous example in 
American memory, over 200 people responded to the media circus 
surrounding Charles Lindberg Jr.’s kidnapping in 1932 by confessing 
to the crime.41 But in the context of modern criminal investigations, 
false confession is a much more complex phenomenon than previously 
thought or conventional wisdom would suggest. 
Psychologists first turned serious attention to false confessions in 
the early twentieth century, led by Harvard University professor Hugo 
Münsterberg.42 In works like his 1908 book On the Witness Stand: 
Essays on Psychology and Crime, he traced the history of false 
confessions in America as far back as the Salem witchcraft trials of 
1692.43 Münsterberg placed much of the blame for the false confessions 
of his era on police brutality and coercion, observing that “[u]nder 
pain and fear a man may make any admission which will relieve his 
suffering, and, still more misleading, his mind may lose the power to 
discriminate between illusion and real memory.”44 Münsterberg also 
noted that some wrongfully accused persons, facing an “unfortunate 
combination of damaging evidence” likely to produce a conviction, 
falsely confessed simply in a bid for leniency.45 
The first significant contribution of legal scholarship to the 
modern understanding of false confession was Borchard’s landmark 
book Convicting the Innocent: Sixty Five Actual Errors of Criminal 
 
39. John Schwartz, Confessing to Crime, but Innocent, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
14, 2010, at A14. 
40. Ian Herbert, The Psychology and Power of False Confessions, Ass’n 
for Psychol. Sci. Observer, Dec. 2009, at 10, 11. 
41. Richard P. Conti, The Psychology of False Confessions, 2 J. 
Credibility Assessment & Witness Psychol. 14, 20 (1999). 
42. Id.  
43. Hugo Münsterberg, On the Witness Stand: Essays on 
Psychology and Crime 145–48 (Clark Boardman Co. 1941) (1908). 
44. Hugo Münsterberg, The Third Degree, McClure’s Mag., Oct. 1907, at 
614. 
45. Münsterberg, supra note 43, at 145. 
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Justice, published in 1932.46 Challenging the “conventional wisdom 
that innocent people [were] never convicted in the American criminal 
justice system,”47 Borchard profiled several cases involving false 
confessions.48 The book was anecdotal, offering no broader analysis of 
the specific factors that led the innocent to confess, nor any statistics 
on how prevalent the problem was.49 Nonetheless, it raised awareness 
in the legal community and eventually helped to spur subsequent 
studies in the field of wrongful conviction and false confession 
research.50 
The first large-scale, systematic social science study of wrongful 
convictions came fifty-five years later, when Hugo Bedau and Michael 
Radelet published Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases 
in 1987.51 The professors’ research shed new light on both the 
prevalence and causes of false confessions. Quantitatively, it showed 
that a false confession had been offered in 49 out of a sample of 350 
erroneous convictions (14 percent).52 Qualitatively, the study showed 
a great diversity of reasons behind the false confessions, from the 
easily understandable to the plainly absurd: 
The false confession was, in some cases, the result of mental 
illness. In other cases, the defendant appears to have falsely 
confessed or pleaded guilty to avoid the risk of a death sentence. 
In two instances the defendant was too intoxicated to remember 
what he did and readily confessed under the inquiries of the 
police. In a few cases, the explanations are almost too bizarre to 
believe: One defendant falsely confessed to the police as a joke; 
another falsely confessed to murder because she did not want to 
be known as a fornicator; and another falsely confessed to 
impress his girlfriend and then, after being convicted for that 
murder, falsely confessed to another murder just to prove that a 
person’s false confession could get him convicted—which it did, 
for the second time!53 
 
46. Edwin M. Borchard, Convicting the Innocent: Sixty Five 
Actual Errors of Criminal Justice (1932). The seminal status of 
this book is discussed in Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The 
Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 
891, 901 (2004). 
47. Drizin & Leo, supra note 46, at 901. 
48. E.g., Borchard, supra note 46, at 110–19 (1932). 
49. Drizin & Leo, supra note 46, at 902. 
50. Id. at 903. 
51. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in 
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21 (1987). 
52. Id. at 57–58. 
53. Id. at 63 (footnotes omitted). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 4·2013 
Re-Punishing the Innocent 
1402 
With such a broad spectrum of conduct, a picture began to emerge 
suggesting that some false confessions were much less blameworthy 
than others. 
The Bedau and Radelet study was widely cited, and other 
research on the role of false confessions in producing wrongful 
convictions soon followed. As for prevalence, other authors using 
different case samples found that a false confession was offered 
between 18 and 25 percent of the time.54 With awareness of the scope 
of the phenomenon growing, researchers also began to analyze the 
modern interrogation process in greater detail, seeking to understand 
why so many people would act in such opposition to their self-
interest. The results of this research provide crucial support for the 
position that denying compensation because of a confession creates a 
serious risk of injustice. 
One fairly intuitive conclusion researchers have reached is that 
certain populations are more susceptible to the pressures of 
interrogation than others. The mentally retarded, for instance, are 
“beyond legitimate dispute” more likely to falsely confess, for reasons 
ranging from an inability to appreciate the consequences of a 
confession to an innate desire to please others by behaving in 
accordance with “the perceived wishes of authority figures.”55 Special 
vulnerability has also been observed among juveniles, and this is 
similarly unsurprising—courts have recognized that “the greatest care 
must be taken to assure that [a minor’s] admission was voluntary, in 
the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that 
it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, 
fright or despair.”56 Following this principle, some jurisdictions 
automatically discount the confessions of minors in the absence of 
corroborating evidence, specifically because of their recognized 
unreliability.57 
 
54. The 18 percent figure derives from a study focused on interrogation 
tactics. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors 
and Recommendations, 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 3, 18 (2010). The 25 
percent figure was calculated by The Innocence Project based on a 
survey conducted in 2003 looking at 140 wrongful convictions. False 
Confessions, Innocence Project, www.innocenceproject.org/understand 
/False-Confessions.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2013). 
55. Morgan Cloud et al., Words without Meaning: The Constitution, 
Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 495, 
503, 511 (2002). 
56. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). 
57. E.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 744(b) (McKinney 2010) (“[A]n 
uncorroborated confession made out of court by a respondent is not 
sufficient” to meet the burden of proof in hearings concerning whether a 
person is in need of supervision). 
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More surprising, however, is the extent to which ordinary, 
innocent adults, who presumably have the full capacity to act in their 
own best interest, are nonetheless susceptible to the pressures of the 
interrogation process. The risk of false self-incrimination among these 
defendants is especially important for this Note, both because it 
challenges commonly held assumptions and because “the vast 
majority of reported false confessions are from cognitively and 
intellectually normal individuals.”58 
What causes an innocent person to confess? Some false 
confessions, of course, are extracted through police misconduct, but 
these have long been recognized as invalid59 and inadmissible,60 and 
they raise issues beyond the scope of this Note. Of greater interest to 
psychological and criminological researchers, and of greater concern 
here, is the question of how innocent suspects can be coaxed into 
confessing even when police stay within the bounds of the law. The 
answer lies in the overwhelming power of modern interrogation 
techniques. 
IV. “We Don’t Interrogate Innocent People” 
Formal modern police interrogation is a “guilt-presumptive process 
. . . led by an authority figure who holds a strong a priori belief about 
 
58. Drizin & Leo, supra note 46, at 920. Notably, there is not universal 
agreement on this point: Drizin and Leo point out at least one author 
who has argued that “for the most part, false confessions are caused not 
by police questioning techniques in general but rather by the application 
of those techniques to certain narrow, mentally limited populations.” 
Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of 
Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 523, 584 (1999). Drizin and Leo conclude, 
however, that this position is unsupported by the available data and 
only serves to perpetuate the myth that intellectually “normal” 
individuals will not falsely confess during interrogation unless subjected 
to extreme duress, such as physical brutality. Drizin & Leo, supra note 
46, at 920 n.156.  
59. See, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 485 (1972) (“The use of 
coerced confessions, whether true or false, is forbidden because the 
method used to extract them offends constitutional principles.”); Brown 
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (noting that a conviction “is a 
mere pretense” when “resting solely upon confessions obtained by 
violence,” and that such a practice is “revolting to the sense of justice” 
and a “clear denial of due process”). 
60. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 (1960) (“[C]ases by now too 
well known and too numerous to bear citation . . . [have] established the 
principle that the Fourteenth Amendment is grievously breached when 
an involuntary confession is obtained by state officers and introduced 
into evidence in a criminal prosecution which culminates in a 
conviction.”). 
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the target.”61 This distinguishes it in a critical way from a “diagnostic” 
interview, the primary purpose of which is fact finding—to determine 
whether a suspect is guilty.62 By the time an investigator decides to 
conduct a formal interrogation, during which he may apply a powerful 
arsenal of manipulative and carefully honed psychological tools, he 
has already made a threshold determination that the truth-seeking 
process of investigation is over, at least temporarily, and he “measures 
success by the ability to extract an admission from [the] target.”63 
A. Innocence and the Likelihood of Being Interrogated 
Because of modern interrogation’s guilt-presumptive focus, it is in 
the interest of justice to minimize the risk that innocent people be 
subjected to it in the first place. But in an unfortunate and well-
documented irony, innocent suspects—who did not commit the crime 
being investigated but have nonetheless aroused police interest—are 
in some ways more likely than guilty ones to become targets of a 
formal interrogation. As common sense suggests and research strongly 
confirms, innocent people are more likely to submit to voluntary 
questioning. The reasons include “strategic self-presentation”64 (not 
wanting to create a false impression of guilt through lack of 
cooperation), a “naive faith in the power of their own innocence to set 
them free,”65 and the “illusion of transparency,”66 a psychological 
“tendency to overestimate the extent to which others can read one’s 
internal states” such as honesty and guiltlessness.67 Furthermore, if 
arrested and taken into custody during an investigation, innocent 
suspects are often more likely than guilty ones to waive Miranda 
rights and answer questions in an interrogation room.68 
 
61. Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: 
A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 Psychol. Sci. Pub. Int. 33, 
41 (2004). 
62. See id. at 44 (describing a “diagnostic” encounter as one intended to 
elicit “confessions from suspects who are guilty, but not from those who 
are innocent”). 
63. Id. at 41. 
64. Id. at 40. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Thomas Gilovich et al., The Illusion of Transparency: Biased 
Assessments of Others’ Ability to Read One’s Emotional States, 75 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 332 (1998). This study notes that “the 
illusion of transparency is a robust phenomenon that applies to a host of 
different internal states.” Id. at 343. 
68. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 61, at 40 (discussing observational 
and controlled laboratory research indicating that “innocent people in 
particular are at risk to waive their rights”). 
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Innocent people thus voluntarily and blamelessly expose 
themselves to police scrutiny that many guilty people avoid. And 
upon doing so, the potential for victimization multiplies. Any 
investigative attention, even in the “diagnostic” context of 
preinterrogation truth seeking, can create an intimidating 
environment that invites misinterpretation of a suspect’s behavior. As 
David Simon, a seasoned observer of homicide detectives in 
Baltimore, has observed,  
[n]ervousness, fear, confusion, hostility, a story that changes or 
contradicts itself—all are signs that the man in an interrogation 
room is lying, particularly in the eyes of someone as naturally 
suspicious as a detective. Unfortunately, these are also signs of a 
human being in a state of high stress, which is pretty much where 
people find themselves after being accused of a capital crime.69 
Once suspicion is aroused, a situation can quickly escalate. In one 
Florida case, widely cited as an example of misplaced suspicion, a 
murder victim’s neighbor voluntarily submitted to questioning on 
multiple occasions because “he thought the police needed his help.”70 
He quickly became the prime suspect after “his face flushed and he 
became embarrassed during the initial questioning.”71 Those 
symptoms had an innocent explanation—the suspect was a recovering 
alcoholic who suffered from an acute anxiety disorder and obsessive 
compulsive personality disorder, which “caused him to sweat profusely 
and become red in the face when he felt people were critically 
observing him.”72 But once investigators saw what they viewed as 
telltale signs of guilt, they subjected the suspect to a sixteen-hour 
formal interrogation that culminated in a coerced (and ultimately 
inadmissible) confession.73 
Innocent suspects’ preinterrogation vulnerability can be 
compounded by another psychological phenomenon called the 
“investigator bias effect.”74 Several studies indicate that training and 
 
69. David Simon, Homicide: A Year on the Killing Streets 206 (1991). 
70. State v. Sawyer, 561 So. 2d 278, 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 290–91. After the confession was suppressed, since “no evidence of 
[Sawyer’s] guilt existed,” the state dismissed all charges against him. 
Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False 
Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the 
Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
429, 458 (1998). 
74. Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, “He’s Guilty!”: Investigator 
Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 Law & Hum. Behav. 
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experience do not produce reliable improvements in investigators’ 
ability to gauge an individual’s truthfulness or deceptiveness.75 But 
such training and experience, typical in law enforcement, has been 
shown to increase investigators’ tendency to see evidence of guilt—
whether or not it exists—thus “increasing the likelihood that they 
would judge targets as deceitful.”76 Such training has also been shown 
to boost investigators’ self-reported confidence, untethered to reality 
though it may be, in their skills of detection.77 
It is important to note that none of the effects described above 
requires or even assumes police misconduct, carelessness, or bad 
faith—they simply reflect the realities of a process that, like any 
other, is susceptible to human fallibility. But the potential cumulative 
effect of these phenomena on innocent suspects is profound. And once 
investigators confidently cross the threshold of believing they have a 
guilty party before them, formal interrogation is the portentous next 
step. Kassin and Gisli Gudjonsson, two leaders in the field of false 
confession research, have observed firsthand the mindset that an 
innocent suspect may unwittingly encounter as a result: 
At a conference on police interviewing that the two of us 
recently attended, Joseph Buckley (2004)—president of John E. 
Reid and Associates (a Chicago-based organization that has 
trained tens of thousands of law-enforcement professionals) and 
coauthor of the widely cited manual Criminal Interrogation and 
Confessions—presented the influential Reid technique of 
interviewing and interrogation. . . . Afterward, an audience 
member asked if his persuasive methods did not at times cause 
innocent people to confess. His reply was, “No, because we don’t 
interrogate innocent people.”78 
B. The Interrogation Process 
The popular assumption discussed in Part III, found in various 
iterations of the insistence that “I would never confess to something I 
didn’t do,”79 supports a theory that one author has called “‘the myth  
469, 473 (2002) (describing findings “suggesting that training and prior 
experience lead to a perceptual bias toward judgments of deceit”). 
75. Id. at 477 (“[R]esearch has generally failed to demonstrate performance 
increments as a function of special training or prior law enforcement 
experience.”).  
76. Id. at 478. 
77. See id. (observing that in a comparison across studies, trained detectives 
were “significantly more confident in their judgments” than trained and 
untrained student research subjects, and noting that this result was 
“consistent with our reanalysis of the literature”). 
78. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 61, at 36 (citation omitted).  
79. Supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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of psychological interrogation’: that an innocent person will not falsely 
confess to a serious crime unless he is physically tortured or mentally 
ill.”80 To understand how such a common-sense belief can be so 
demonstrably inaccurate, researchers have focused on the dynamics of 
modern interrogation and its capacity to produce false confessions. 
Criminal interrogators may employ a broad array of techniques, 
but researchers studying why false confessions occur have observed a 
unified theme: the desire to “manipulate the perceptions, reasoning, and 
decision-making of a custodial suspect and thus lead to the decision to 
confess.”81 One of the most widely utilized methods, and an appropriate 
illustrative example, is the Reid technique referenced above. This 
method, first made public in 1974, is promoted as having been 
“successfully utilized . . . to solve literally hundreds of thousands of 
crimes.”82 It has been taught to “more than 200,000 investigators in 
private industry, law enforcement and the Federal government,”83 and 
is endorsed in Criminal Interrogation and Confessions,84 “the most 
widely read and best known police interrogation manual in American 
history.”85 The interrogation stage of the Reid technique breaks down 
into nine steps: 
Step One. The Positive Confrontation. By accusing the suspect 
at the outset, the interrogator immediately establishes an 
atmosphere of confidence, and is also able to observe and 
evaluate the suspect’s reaction to being accused. . . . 
Step Two. Theme Development. . . . [A] successful interrogator 
develops “themes” or reasons that allow the suspect to salvage 
self-respect while confessing. 
Step Three. Handling Denials. Before a suspect can become 
attentive to theme development and confess guilt, they must be 
stopped from continuing to deny involvement. . . . 
Step Four. Overcoming Objections. . . . Techniques for 
overcoming a guilty suspect’s objections and moving toward a 
confession . . . . 
 
80. Drizin & Leo, supra note 46, at 910. 
81. Id.  
82. Brian C. Jayne & Joseph P. Buckley, The Reid Technique of Interrogation, 
John E. Reid & Assocs., Inc., http://www.reid.com/educational_info 
/canada.html (last visited May 7, 2013). 
83. Id. 
84. Fred E. Inbau et al., Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 
(5th ed. 2013). 
85. Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure 546 (13th ed. 
2012). 
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Step Five. Procuring and Retaining the Suspect’s Attention. . . . 
[P]hysical closeness and verbal techniques used by the 
interviewer are methods for acquiring and maintaining a 
suspect’s attention. 
Step Six. Handling the Suspect’s Passive Mood. . . . 
[R]ecognizing that the suspect has “given up” and is ready to 
confess . . . [and] focusing . . . the general theme onto one or 
two essential elements that will stimulate the confession. 
Step Seven. Presenting an Alternative Question. To obtain the 
first admission of guilt from the suspect, a question with only 
two possible answers (either of which is incriminating) is 
asked. . . . 
Step Eight. Detailing the Offense. Corroboration of an 
admission of guilt is obtained through details of the offense 
supplied by the suspect. . . . 
Step Nine. Elements of Oral and Written Statements. Proper 
handling of the suspect’s oral statements and the reductions of 
such statements to a written, typed or recorded 
confession . . . .86 
Kassin and Gudjonsson have observed that the “nine steps are 
essentially reducible to an interplay of three processes” commonly 
utilized in modern criminal interrogation: isolation, confrontation, and 
minimization.87 
Investigators and scholars have recognized the impact of isolation 
in unfamiliar surroundings for decades. Research in the 1960s 
observed that “such isolation heightens the anxiety associated with 
custodial interrogation and, over extended periods of time, increases a 
suspect’s incentive to escape.”88 This makes intuitive sense, as the 
“needs for belonging, affiliation, and social support, especially in times 
of stress, are a fundamental human motive,” deprivation of which can 
provoke a strong reaction.89 “False confession is an escape hatch. It 
 
86. John E. Reid & Assocs., Inc., The Reid Technique of Interviewing 
and Interrogation® and The Advanced Course on the Reid 
Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation® (2013). 
87. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 61, at 43. 
88. Id. at 53 (citing P.G. Zimbardo, The Psychology of Police Confessions, 
1 Psychol. Today 17–20, 25–27 (1967)). 
89. Kassin et al., supra note 54, at 16 (citing Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. 
Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a 
Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 Pscyhol. Bull. 497 (1995)). 
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becomes rational under the circumstances,”90 Kassin has noted, adding 
that the most common explanation given after a false confession is 
that the suspect “just wanted to go home.”91 The impact of isolation 
is also reflected in anecdotal evidence from wrongfully convicted 
individuals. A Long Island murder defendant profiled by The New 
York Times in 1998 after his confession was proven false provides a 
typical example—the man was “tired, lonely and scared” after a long 
interrogation and “wanted to go home,” so he eventually told police 
what he knew they wanted to hear.92 
Confrontation in the interrogation context may involve several 
different tactics. An interrogator may begin with “strong assertions of 
. . . guilt designed to communicate that resistance is futile.”93 Such 
accusations serve to “exploit the psychology of inevitability to drive 
suspects into a state of despair.”94 Police are trained to challenge any 
resistance that the suspect offers, using methods such as “repeatedly 
accusing the suspect of committing the crime and lying about it; 
cutting off and interrupting denials; attacking alibis or assertions of 
innocence as illogical, implausible, or untrue; [and] insisting that no 
one will believe the suspect’s protestations of innocence.”95 The 
interrogator emphasizes that the suspect’s guilt is already beyond 
doubt, and that the only remaining questions concern how, not 
whether, the suspect committed the crime.96 
One especially effective—and controversial—confrontation tool to 
help establish that “resistance is futile” involves presenting the 
suspect with fabricated evidence indicating his guilt. Created to help 
convince a suspect not to persist with denials, such evidence can take 
many forms, including “a fingerprint, blood or hair sample, eyewitness 
identification, or [a] failed polygraph.”97 Because of its highly 
manipulative potential, this tactic is forbidden in most European 
 
90. Alexandra Perina, “I Confess”: Why Would an Innocent Person Profess 
Guilt?, Psychol. Today, Mar./Apr. 2003, at 11, 11 (2003) (quoting 
Saul Kassin). 
91. Id. 
92. Jan Hoffman, Police Refine Methods So Potent, Even the Innocent Have 
Confessed, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1998, at A1.  
93. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 61, at 54. 
94. Id. 
95. Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions 
and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 
479, 516 (2006). 
96. See Jayne & Buckley, supra note 82 (providing one example of such a 
statement used in interrogation: “While there is no doubt that you did 
this, what I need to establish are the circumstances that led up to this 
happening”). 
97. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 61, at 54. 
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countries.98 In the United States, however, the Supreme Court stated 
in Frazier v. Cupp99 that lying to a suspect about evidence during 
interrogation, without more, is “insufficient . . . to make [an] 
otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible,”100 and subsequent 
decisions have interpreted Frazier as allowing police deception during 
an interrogation.101 
Credible evidence indicates that the risk of obtaining false 
confessions from innocent suspects increases dramatically when police 
employ such manipulation. Professor Welsh White is among many 
scholars who have concluded that “[b]ased on the empirical data, . . . 
[w]hen an interrogator deceives a suspect as to the nature of the 
evidence against him, falsely leading him to believe that the police 
have overwhelming evidence of his guilt, the suspect is likely to give 
an untrustworthy confession.”102 The effect has been observed in 
scholarly reviews of actual false confession cases,103 and has been 
 
98. Id. 
99. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969). 
100. Id. at 739. In Frazier, an interrogator lied to the defendant about an 
accomplice’s confession, and the defendant subsequently made 
incriminating statements that he later sought, unsuccessfully, to have 
suppressed. 
101. The Frazier opinion did not specify whether any limits exist on the 
extent of police authority to use deception, and the Court has since 
passed up several opportunities to impose such limits. See Laurie Magid, 
Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far Is Too Far?, 99 
Mich. L. Rev. 1168, 1176 & n.41 (2001) (listing subsequent decisions 
and noting that “in several cases that the Court heard on other issues, 
deception had been used during interrogation, and the Court made no 
unfavorable comment about the deception”). Notably, however, some 
courts have imposed limits in certain circumstances. See, e.g., State v. 
Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (suppressing a 
confession after police fabricated “tangible documentation” in the form 
of a written lab report indicating, falsely, that a defendant’s semen was 
found on a victim’s underwear—a transgression that the court said 
“offends . . . traditional notions of due process”). 
102. Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards 
Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 105, 
146 (1997). For a more detailed discussion of the arguments against 
allowing police deception during interrogations, including the increased 
risk of false confession, see Irina Khasin, Note, Honesty Is the Best 
Policy: A Case for the Limitation of Deceptive Police Interrogation 
Practices in the United States, 42 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1029 
(2009). 
103. See, e.g., Kassin et al., supra note 54, at 17 (noting that “studies of 
actual cases reveal that the false evidence ploy . . . is found in numerous 
wrongful convictions in the U.S., including DNA exonerations, in which 
there were confessions in evidence,” and listing several references). 
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reproduced in controlled laboratory settings using psychological and 
behavioral research methods.104 
Being confronted with false evidence can create a strong 
impression that conviction is a foregone conclusion. This, in turn, can 
provoke a key mental shift in a suspect, as “research shows that once 
people see an outcome as inevitable, cognitive and motivational forces 
conspire to promote their acceptance, compliance with, and even 
approval of the outcome.”105 When Jerry Lee Louis was suspected of a 
Florida murder in 1992, interrogators told him that eyewitnesses had 
identified him (none had), that his hair and fingerprints were found at 
the crime scene (they weren’t), and that he had failed a polygraph 
test (he hadn’t).106 Faced with such seemingly insurmountable 
evidence, Louis finally acquiesced and told police “what they wanted 
to hear” because, as he later told his lawyer, he “had given up hope 
that telling the truth would earn him back his freedom.”107 
The third common aspect of modern criminal interrogation, 
minimization, aims to convince a suspect that the consequences of 
confessing are so low, relative to the potential consequences of not 
confessing, that confession is in his best interest. Effective minimization 
is “designed to lull a suspect into believing that the magnitude of the 
charges and the seriousness of the offense will be downplayed or 
lessened if he confesses.”108 As with confrontation, an interrogator 
employing minimization may mislead the suspect to manipulate his 
reasoning. In homicide cases, for instance, “interrogators often suggest 
that if the suspect admits to the crime it will be framed as an 
unintentional accident or as an act of justifiable self-defense, but that if 
he continues to deny guilt, his actions will be portrayed in their worst 
possible light—as premeditated, cold-blooded murder.”109 
Minimization conveys to a suspect, implicitly or explicitly, that 
confession provides a way out of what seems like a hopeless 
predicament. It entails “providing moral justification or face-saving 
excuses,” such as that the suspect’s actions were “spontaneous, 
accidental, provoked, peer pressured, drug induced, or otherwise 
 
104. See, e.g., Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 61, at 54–55 (discussing 
multiple such studies and interpreting their results in the context of 
false confession analysis). 
105. Id. at 54. 
106. Hoffman, supra note 92 . 
107. Id. Louis was eventually released after it became clear that his two 
separate confessions were “both wildly at odds with the crime scene and 
witness reports” and a judge suppressed them. Id. By that time, 
however, he had spent over four years in a county jail awaiting trial. Id. 
108. Drizin & Leo, supra note 46, at 912. 
109. Id. at 917 (footnotes omitted). 
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justifiable by external factors.”110 It may even involve shifting blame 
to the victim, with an interrogator suggesting that anyone in the 
suspect’s position would have committed the same crime.111 
The police must take care, of course, to avoid making an overt 
promise of leniency in exchange for a confession, as courts have long 
recognized that this practice jeopardizes the subsequent confession’s 
voluntariness.112 But even in the absence of a concrete promise, 
psychological research has found that interrogation targets are 
susceptible to veiled suggestions of lenient treatment in exchange for a 
confession.113 Kassin and Gudjonsson thus conclude that minimization 
may serve as “the implicit but functional equivalent to a promise of 
leniency,” such that the “net result is to put innocents at risk to make 
false confessions.”114 
With such potent tools as isolation, confrontation, and 
minimization at police disposal, modern interrogation can leave 
innocent suspects vulnerable. This is strongly suggested by the 
research showing that 18 to 25 percent of wrongful convictions 
involved a false confession.115 But arguably the most convincing 
evidence of modern interrogation’s overwhelming psychological power 
is a byproduct documented in several interrogation-induced false 
confessions: internalization. “[I]nnocent but vulnerable suspects, under 
the influence of highly suggestive interrogation tactics, come not only 
 
110. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 61, at 55. 
111. Criminal Interrogation and Confessions provides several sample 
monologues to illustrate such blame-shifting. For instance, if an 
employee is suspected of stealing from his employer, the authors 
recommend this empathetic approach: “Anyone else confronted with a 
similar situation probably would have done the same thing, Joe. Your 
company is at fault. . . . [I]f you received a decent salary in the first 
place, you wouldn’t be here and I wouldn’t be talking to you.” Inbau 
et al., supra note 84, at 223. 
112. See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897) (“A 
confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner has been 
influenced by any threat or promise; for the law cannot measure the 
force of the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of 
the prisoner . . . .”). This rule has been somewhat relaxed over time. 
“[T]he modern view” is that promises offered during interrogation “are 
rarely determinative on their own . . . . [T]he key question is whether 
the inducement is ‘so attractive as to render a confession involuntary.’ ” 
Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the 
Voluntariness of Confession in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 Val. U. L. 
Rev. 601, 606–07 (2006). 
113. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 61, at 55 (discussing research 
analyzing the interplay between minimization, perceived promises of 
leniency, and confessions). 
114. Id. 
115. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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to capitulate in their behavior, but also to believe that they 
committed the crime in question, sometimes confabulating false 
memories in the process.”116 No figures exist on the prevalence of 
internalization among false confessors, but the prospect of an 
interrogation resulting in actual memories of fictional guilty acts is an 
acute reminder of how thoroughly innocent suspects can be manipulated. 
“‘I remember slashing once at my mother’s throat with a straight 
razor,’” confessed eighteen-year-old Peter Reilly in a 1973 Connecticut 
murder case that “entered the legal annals as perhaps the classic 
instance of a suspect under interrogation becoming convinced that he 
committed a crime he did not do.”117 Reilly was convicted of 
manslaughter based almost entirely on his confession, which he 
provided after eight hours of interrogation and which included several 
graphic details about the crime.118 He was exonerated three years 
later, when a subsequent investigation proved he was five miles away 
at the time of the killing.119 
V. A More Just Conception of “Contribution” 
“It no longer seems rational to consider all false confessions as 
misconduct, because multiple exonerations prove that innocent 
people falsely implicate themselves, despite gaining nothing for 
themselves in the process.” 120 
A generation’s worth of new research into modern interrogation 
practices and their effects has shown convincingly that innocent people 
can be psychologically manipulated into confessing—that they can be 
blameless victims of a well-intentioned but imperfect investigative 
process. These findings help explain the otherwise seemingly 
inconceivable fact that so many exonerees have confessed to crimes 
they did not commit. The findings should also force a reevaluation of 
how a false confession fits into the analysis of whether an exoneree 
made a truly blameworthy contribution to his erroneous conviction. 
As discussed in Part II, no state statute contains language 
explicitly denying compensation to all exonerees who falsely confessed. 
But several states’ provisions aimed at exonerees whose conduct caused 
or brought about their conviction “may prevent people who falsely 
 
116. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 61, at 50. 
117. Donald S. Connery, Peter Reilly, in True Stories of False 
Confessions 47, 69–70 (Rob Warden & Steven A. Drizin eds., 2009) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
118. Id. at 69. 
119. Id. at 70. 
120. Bernhard, supra note 26, at 718 (footnote omitted). 
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confessed . . . from receiving compensation.”121 The case of Douglas 
Warney, introduced at the start of this Note, illustrates that such 
statutory ambiguity creates a very real risk that falsely confessing 
exonerees could be left empty handed. 
Warney’s original claim for compensation under New York’s 
Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act, filed after his release in 
May 2006, was dismissed by the New York Court of Claims upon a 
motion by the state.122 In upholding that decision on appeal, the 
Supreme Court’s Appellate Division pointed to an earlier state case, 
O’Donnell v. State, which had concluded as part of its interpretation 
of the Act that “an innocent criminal defendant may cause or bring 
about his or her own conviction by making an uncoerced false 
confession of guilt that is presented to the jury at trial.”123 While that 
analysis in O’Donnell was dicta, as the case did not involve a false 
confession,124 it had a legitimate foundation. In the legislative history 
of the Act, contained in New York’s Report of the Law Revision 
Commission for 1984, the commission had placed “giving an 
uncoerced confession of guilt” first on its list of examples of claimant 
“misconduct” that could “cause or bring about his prosecution.”125 
In Warney’s case, after establishing that a false confession could 
trigger the statutory denial of compensation, the Appellate Division 
decided with very little analysis that he had failed to state a viable 
claim under the Act. Warney had emphasized that the circumstances 
of his interrogation suggested coercion, but to no avail—the court 
dismissively observed that “he merely surmises that his confession 
must have been coerced because it was later shown to be false when 
someone else confessed to the crime.”126 
Absent from the opinion was any recognition of potential fault in 
the interrogation process, or of the possibility that, even if Warney’s 
confession had not been obtained through police behavior meeting the 
legal standard of coercion (in which case it would clearly not bar 
 
121. Lost Time, supra note 17, at 27–31. 
122. Warney v. State, 894 N.Y.S.2d 574 (App. Div. 2010). 
123. Id. at 275 (citing O’Donnell v. State, 808 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (App. Div. 
2005)). 
124. The exoneree’s alleged contributory conduct in O’Donnell involved 
offering an alibi that “ha[d] inconsistencies and contradictions . . . [and] 
certainly may well have led to his conviction” at trial. O’Donnell, 808 
N.Y.S.2d at 269 (alterations in original). 
125. State of N.Y., Report of the Law Revision Commission, Doc. 
No. 65, at 75–76 (1984). 
126. Warney, 894 N.Y.S.2d. at 275. 
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recovery),127 it might still not have constituted true “misconduct” by 
Warney.128 This is unsurprising in context, since Warney’s central 
argument on appeal was that his confession had been coerced, so he 
evidently did not attempt to raise the broader issue of innocent 
suspects’ vulnerability to manipulation in the interrogation room.129 
But the court’s formalistic approach, concluding with scant analysis 
that an uncoerced false confession met the literal statutory 
requirement and the legislature’s conception of conduct contributing 
to a conviction, exemplifies the risk any exoneree may face in a state 
with a similar restriction. 
New York’s highest court reversed the dismissal of Warney’s 
claim in March 2011, but it relied on procedural grounds—the lower 
courts had made “factual determinations” concerning his allegations 
of coercion “that were inappropriate at [that] stage of the 
litigation.”130 The closest that the court came to addressing broader 
substantive issues, such as when a false confession should meet the 
statutory requirement to preclude compensation, concerned the 
definition of coercion. A concurring opinion stated that “a confession 
cannot fairly be called ‘uncoerced’ that results from the sort of 
calculated manipulation that appears to be present here—even if the 
police did not actually beat or torture the confessor, or threaten to do 
so.”131 The manipulation “present here,” however, exceeded the 
ordinary bounds of even modern interrogation trickery, as police 
allegedly fed Warney nonpublic details of the crime, then pointed to 
his accurate recounting of those details in the confession as proof of 
 
127. Warney, 947 N.E.2d at 644 (“[A] coerced false confession does not bar 
recovery under section 8-b because it is not the claimant’s ‘own conduct’ 
within the meaning of the statute.”). 
128. It is noteworthy that the Report of the Law Revision Commission for 
1984 uses the word “misconduct” (which implies some degree of inherent 
blameworthiness or wrongdoing) to describe the examples of conduct 
contributing to a conviction, while the Act itself uses the more neutral 
word “conduct.” Warney highlighted this distinction on appeal to the 
Court of Appeals, but the court found it unnecessary to rule on the 
implications of the language discrepancy because Warney had alleged 
that his confession was coerced, and hence not properly viewed as his 
own “conduct” or “misconduct.” Id. at 644 n.3. 
129. See id. at 644 (“Warney alleges in detail that his confession was 
coerced . . . .”). 
130. Id. at 644. After this victory, which allowed Warney’s compensation claim 
to proceed to discovery, the state finally settled with him, paying $3.75 
million for his 108-month incarceration. Emily Lurie, Douglas Warney 
Awarded $3.75 Million, False Confessions Blog (Dec. 7, 2011), 
http://www.falseconfessions.org/blog/2011/12/douglas-warney. 
131. Warney, 947 N.E.2d at 646 (Smith, J., concurring). 
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its credibility.132 The court had no occasion to decide what types or 
degrees of manipulation rise to the level of legally cognizable coercion, 
or, more broadly, to consider the policy question of whether widely 
used modern interrogation practices might be so inherently 
manipulative as to justify an inference of coercion after a confession is 
proven false.  
But it is precisely those questions that must be addressed by 
future courts, legislators, and policy makers to prevent unjust 
outcomes for exonerees who falsely confessed prior to conviction. We 
now have an unprecedented scientific understanding of how innocent 
people can be pressured into confessing under circumstances that 
cannot reasonably be deemed blameworthy. Until we apply that 
knowledge to the statutory frameworks that govern exoneree 
compensation, our legal system risks re-punishing wrongly convicted 
false confessors who cannot show police misconduct that fits into the 
existing legal conception of coercion. 
Fortunately, a workable remedy to this problem is straightforward 
and employs a device already very familiar to American jurisprudence. 
A properly crafted rebuttable presumption can respect legislators’ 
concerns about “rewarding” undeserving individuals with public money, 
while more narrowly tailoring the statutory restriction so that it affects 
only the truly undeserving. As suggested by Professor Adele Bernhard, 
“courts should presume all false confessions to be the product of 
coercion [and hence not a claimant contribution to the conviction] 
unless they can be shown otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.”133 
 
132. This alleged misconduct was Warney’s primary basis for establishing 
coercion. The strength of his position was on display at oral argument 
before the Court of Appeals, when Warney’s attorneys turned the tables 
on the prosecutors’ reasoning: now that Warney had been proven 
innocent, his “knowledge” of so many details about the crime could only 
have come from police interrogators improperly feeding him information. 
The following exchange demonstrated the merit of his claim: 
“Is there any other possible theory [of how the confession 
contained such detail]?” Judge Smith asked. 
“There are other possible theories,” Ms. Nathan [representing the 
state] said. 
“How about one, just for the sake of argument,” Judge Smith said. 
“He had knowledge of the victim’s home,” Ms. Nathan said. 
“No,” Judge Smith said. “The 12-inch serrated knife, stabbed into 
him 15 times. How did he know that?” 
“He may have been asked a leading question,” Ms. Nathan said. 
Jim Dwyer, Confessions, Manipulation and Injustice, N.Y. Times, April 
2, 2011, at A14. 
133. Bernhard, supra note 26, at 720. 
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Such a scheme would reflect the research-supported reality that 
many false confessions are not the product of actual defendant 
misconduct. At the same time, it would continue to shield the public 
coffers from confessors who “specifically intended to distort the truth-
seeking function of the police investigation.”134 The clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard seems appropriate, as that same standard is 
commonly employed for other elements of state compensation 
statutes.135 And more importantly, the standard in this context errs 
on the side of the exoneree, which is sound public policy, since the 
harm of compensating a potentially undeserving claimant in a “close 
call” seems far outweighed by the harm of denying compensation to a 
deserving claimant whose life has been so drastically upset by 
wrongful incarceration.136 
Precisely what conduct must be shown to rebut the presumption 
of coercion should be the subject of separate scholarship and 
legislative deliberation, and decisions in this regard could be informed 
by past instances of clear misconduct. Examples might include 
confessing to protect a coconspirator or other known perpetrator, to 
secure benefits for family members from organized crime, to avoid 
revealing other personal misconduct, or for self-aggrandizement.137 As 
a critical caveat, Bernhard notes that a court’s inquiry into coercion 
for compensation purposes should be entirely independent from any 
prior ruling on the confession’s admissibility at trial. The admissibility 
standard is tied to voluntariness, and “[i]n determining voluntariness, 
coercive techniques are not necessarily determinative. As a result, 
although police interrogation techniques may create false confessions, 
they do not always render confessions ‘involuntary’ as a matter of 
law . . . .”138 Accordingly, “a pretrial ruling on admissibility should 
play no role in deciding whether to award compensation.”139  
134. Id. 
135. See Adam I. Kaplan, Comment, The Case for Comparative Fault in 
Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 227, 250 
n.154 (2008) (observing that many state compensation statutes “require 
that the claimant prove by clear and convincing evidence” that he did 
not commit the crime for which he was imprisoned, “although some utilize a 
different standard (generally, a preponderance of the evidence)”). 
136. This value judgment is also a fitting counterpart to the “fundamental 
value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an 
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see supra note 10. 
137. See, e.g., Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Proposal to Reverse the View 
of a Confession: From Key Evidence Requiring Corroboration to 
Corroboration for Key Evidence, 44 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 511, 523 
(2011) (listing a wide spectrum of documented reasons why defendants have 
falsely confessed, ranging from “fear of the death penalty” to “as a joke”). 
138. Bernhard, supra note 26, at 721 (footnote omitted). 
139. Id. 
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Conclusion 
The issue discussed in this Note does not directly impact a great 
many people, and it thankfully never will. Only a tiny sliver of the 
population will ever experience the nightmare of a wrongful conviction 
leading to incarceration. Of those, only a small (but growing) number 
will have the opportunity, resources, and good fortune to prove their 
innocence and reverse their convictions. Of those, only a fraction will 
live in a state that provides for uniform compensation via statute; a 
still smaller fraction will live in a state with a statutory restriction 
based on the exoneree’s preconviction conduct. And of those, only a 
minority will have falsely confessed to the crime for which they were 
incarcerated. In terms of raw numbers, this is not the most pressing 
social justice issue of our time. 
But as Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. famously recognized in one of 
the wisest maxims humanity has ever produced, “injustice anywhere is 
a threat to justice everywhere.”140 If the American criminal justice 
system aspires to follow that basic principle, it must take extraordinary 
care to protect those who are most victimized by its imperfections. This 
is especially so when new information reveals that our traditional 
conceptions of culpability, and the laws we have built around those 
conceptions, no longer account for all we know about the complexities 
of real life. “[L]et us be realists,”141 wrote Dean John H. Wigmore in 
support of the first federal exoneree compensation statute in 1912, in 
words equally applicable a century later to the issue discussed herein. 
“Let us confess that of course [our justice] may and does err 
occasionally. And when the occasion is plainly seen, let us complete our 
justice by awarding compensation. . . . To ignore such a claim is to 
make shameful an error which before was pardonable.”142 
Gregory P. Scholand † 
 
140. Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963). 
141. John H. Wigmore, Editorial Preface to Edwin M. Borchard, State 
Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice 3 (1912). 
142. Id. 
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